(PDF) THE 1938 MUNICH AGREEMENT: BRITAIN SETTLED FOR HOPE OVER CONFRONTATION DESPITE CREDIBLE OPTIONS TO OPPOSE HITLER | Ethan Fisher - Academia.eduhttps://www.academia.edu/1868475/THE_1938_MUNICH_AGREEMENT_BRITAIN_SETTLED_FOR_HOPE_OVER_CONFRONTATION_DESPITE_CREDIBLE_OPTIONS_TO_OPPOSE_HITLER World History 9Ethan Fisher THE 1938 MUNICH AGREEMENT:BRITAIN SETTLED FOR HOPE OVER CONFRONTATIONDESPITE CREDIBLE OPTIONS TO OPPOSE HITLER8 May 2012Mr. AdkisonWord Count: 5085
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In the first place, the Czechoslovakian armymay have had the ability to defend itself from Germany on its own without the need of immediate support from France or Britain. Moreover, there were inconsistent reportsas to the size and strength of Germany’s military force. Lastly and most importantly,
Britain was aware that various German generals were not supportive of Hitler andwere willing to stage a coup if Czechoslovakia was invaded. Accordingly, thismindset may have also signaled a broader lack of support from the German peopleas a whole.
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To illustrate, a British official wrote to Chamberlain’s office in September 11 about the German people’s lack of interest of war by stating:
“Public opinion is much alarmed at Germany military measures which as theyincreases in scope, are becoming more widely known.
There is a general fear that an attack of Czechoslovakia may lead to a European war, which Germany would be likely to lose.”
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On a separate occasion, Hitler’s lack of public support was again reinforced onSeptember 27 when Henderson observed during Hitler’s military parade in Berlin that“not a single individual in the streets applauded.”5
Given those circumstances, anexamination of the three factors raises the essential question: Should the Munich Agreement have been signed?Prior to the signing of the Munich Agreement, Western Europe 1938 wasengulfed with fear of war with Hitler’s Germany. Nearly two decades earlier, theTreaty of Versailles was signed, signaling the end of World War I, forcing Germany torelinquish part of its European territories. Post World War I, British diplomacy wasbest described by the British Foreign Office in 1926 as: “We have got all that we want – perhaps more. Our sole objective is to keep what we have and to live in peace.”
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When Adolf Hitler obtained power of Germany in 1933, Western Europe was mostlyaccepting of Hitler’s ideas that Germany was treated unfairly during Versailles.
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For this reason, Britain’s foreign policy agenda by 1936 was to “avoid exclusive alliancesin favor of a policy that would allow Germany to play the part of a good European.”
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When he successfully defeated a group of communists from gaining power inGermany, Hitler provided some comfort to Western Europe.
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Certainly, this actionpleased Western Europe as they viewed communism to be the real threat, not Hitler.10
On March 7, 1936, sensing that Britain and France would not take action tostop him, Hitler moved military forces back into the Rhineland, a part of Germany thatwas to remain without any German military forces, according to the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler’s belief was proven correct as neither Britain nor France preventedhim from building up Germany’s military in this de-militarized zone. In essence,German’s re-occupation of the Rhineland marked a turning point in Hitler’s rise topower that would eventually lead to an inevitable war. As Britain and France sat backand watched, Hitler began to improve Germany’s military strength; he set out a planto re-gain control over other parts of Europe that were populated mostly by Germans
Fisher pg. 3
but no longer within its borders.
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In his policy of expansion, Hitler first targeted Austria. In 1938, he successfully reached agreement with Austria’s government. Ineffect, this agreement allowed Hitler to annex Austria without a single gunshot. WithGermany showing off its military strength on the border with Austria, Hitler was ableto convince Austria to vote for the annexation by Germany. In March 1938, Hitler ledthe march into Austria without any bloodshed.
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Choosing to ignore this, Britain continued to support Hitler’s actions;Chamberlain continued to express willingnessto improve relations with Berlin “in order to secure the kind of European pacificationthat had been dreamt of by British governments goal since 1919.”
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Shortly after Austria was annexed, Hitler next turned his efforts to reclaimparts of Czechoslovakia. In May 1938, Hitler put in place a plan to invadeCzechoslovakia. According to a letter from General Keitel, the Chief of the German Armed Forces, a detailed plan stated the “preparations for war” and clarified that “itsexecution must be assured by October 1, 1938, at the latest.”
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WithinCzechoslovakia there was a Sudeten German Party that represented the borderinglands with Germany that were still populated by mostly German decent. Under theadvice of Hitler, the leader of the Sudeten German Party negotiated with theCzechoslovakian Government on disputes it had and further discussed the possibilityof breaking away to join with Germany. Hitler advised the Sudeten German Party tokeep demanding for more, even though the Czechoslovakian Government gave in onnearly all of the original issues.
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By July 1938, the negotiations were breaking downand Germany made it clear that it would not back down. As a precaution, NevilleHenderson, British ambassador to Germany, advised Chamberlain not to take anaggressive position against Hitler because a “blow to Hitler’s prestige might well havecontrary effect and drive him over the edge.”
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Not to mention, the language used between governments grew more direct, and inSeptember 1938,
Hitler stated with regards to the Sudetenland, “I am determined tosettle it. I do not care whether there is a world war or not.”23
At the same time,Neville Henderson, British foreign minister, communicated about Germany toChamberlain on September 3, 1938 that a German official said there was a
“lack of enthusiasm in the country for war and went so far as to observe thatthis lack of enthusiasm in the back areas would be a serious handicap after thefirst few months of war, if it occurred. Nor were the generals themselvesenthusiastic. Their instructions were to be 100 percent ready for alleventualities as from a certain date, but, so far as he could discover, they hadno other instructions and no information as to the Chancellor’s [Hitler] real intentions.”
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In spite of this, German troops were moving to the border and Czechoslovakiantroops were actively preparing. Chamberlain, nevertheless, still remained confident...
II. Coup Discussions Against Hitler: A Credible Threat
In his desperate attempts to avoid war, Chamberlain rushed into signing theMunich Agreement without considering other credible policies to oppose Hitler.Despite Hitler’s successes and ambitions in building the German army and hisaspirations to invade parts of Europe, not all of Hitler’ generals were supportive of hisintentions.
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In fact,his generals were willing to stage a coup against him becausethey did not want to go to war . Incidentally, before his trip to London, GermanGeneral Beck ordered to an official: “Bring me certain proof that Britain will fight if Czechoslovakia is attacked and I will make an end of this régime.”27
Between Augustand September 1938, German generals contacted senior British government officialson several occasions to seek their assistance.
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Furthermore, Beck’s attitude wasshared directly with the British on August 13
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in a meeting between a British and aGerman official where the German official made it clear that all German generalswere “dead against war but they will not have the power to stop it unless they get encouragement and help from outside.”29
Namely, the help that the German conspirators were seeking focused on two areas. First, they wanted the Britishgovernment to make strong public statements that opposed Hitler’s actions and thatHitler’s actions would lead to war as Britain would not stand by and watch him invadea sovereign country. Second, the German conspirators wanted assurance that if Hitler did order an invasion of Czechoslovakia, Britain would support Czechoslovakia.However, each of these requests was counter to Chamberlain’s policy of appeasingHitler in the hope of obtaining peace. In the same meeting, the German officialindicated that the views of the German generals were consistent with the views of thepeople who were “terribly alarmed at the prospect of war.
Additional contacts were made in September to Lord Halifax in which
British assistance was asked for again in the form of a public statement declaring that the British government was not supportive of Germany attacking Czechoslovakia.Moreover, Lord Halifax was also told that the German army was ready to take action against Hitler if necessary but only if the Britain opposed Hitler.31
Chamberlain,however, remained very skeptical on the German approach of overthrowing Hitler,and in reference to the August 11 meeting Chamberlain said that he viewed theGerman official as:
“very anti-Hitler and is extremely anxious to stir up his friends in Germany tomake an attempt at its overthrown. He reminds me of the Jacobites at theCourt of France in King William’s time and I think we must discount a gooddeal of what he says.”
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III. The Relative Military Strengths of Germany
In addition to the lack of support from Hitler’s own army, an important pointthat was overlooked was the actual the strength of the German army. In the decadesfollowing the war, the facts were clear: the German army was not nearly as strong aspublicly advertised;
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IV. The Relative Military Strengths of Czechoslovakia
Notwithstanding the contradictions of the size of the German army, what reallymattered in this analysis is how the German army compared to the strength of theCzechoslovakian military. In 1938, the Czechoslovak army “comprised 17 infantry
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and 4 mobile divisions. Full mobilizations yielded a further 17 reserve divisions,giving a field army of 38 divisions.”
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In addition, there were approximately another 15 divisions along its borders. While Czechoslovakia had a much larger infantry,Germany was more superior in the air. However, in September, the weather waspoor and it was not likely that there was good visibility,
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giving the Czechs theadvantage. Even within the British military, the view was that the Czechoslovakianmilitary was not only prepared to fight but that they also wanted to fight. InSeptember 1938, Lieutenant Colonel Stronge, British Military Attache, provided abriefing of the Czechoslovakian military readiness:
“The Czech General Staff undoubtedly have a capacity for organization, and Ido not expect any serious hitch in the process of rapid mobilization
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For anarmy which is not absolutely of the front rank the equipment, especially asregards arms, is surprisingly good. The country has the advantage of possessing an arms industry which can vie with any other in the world
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Mypersonal opinion is that the morale of the Czech army and nation is high
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Tosum it up, there are no shortcomings in the Czech army.”
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Despite the overwhelming evidence of Czechoslovakia’s ability to defend itself if the dispute came to war, Britain’s diplomat in Berlin, Neville Henderson himself asserted that he thought “the Czechs would collapse much quicker than people think,after the first week or two.”
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Hitler occupied the rest of Czechoslovakia that “Bohemia and Moravia, with some 3.5billion Reichsmarks’ worth of gold, foreign currency and stockpiled raw material andfinished goods saved Hitler’s Reich from speedy economic collapse,” further implyingthat perhaps Britain did not seriously consider the causes and effects of its decisions.In Addition to this point, Ferguson concluded:
“Hitler gained immediately from Munich. With Czechoslovakia emasculated,Germany’s eastern frontier was significantly less venerable.
In occupying theSudetenland, the Germans acquired at a stroke 1.5 million rifles, 750 aircraft,600 tanks, and 2,000 field guns, all of which were to prove useful in they yearsto come.
Indeed, more than one in ten of the tanks used by the Germans intheir western offensive of 1940 were Czech-built…
To put it another way: itwould prove much harder to fight Germany in 1939 than it would have provedto fight Germany in 1938.”
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But one can’thelp but wonder if the policies that led to the Munich Agreement were driven more simply on the personal attitudes of Chamberlain towards Hitler. As summarized inRobert Beck’s Munich’s Lessons Reconsidered , Chamberlain thought that Hitler “meant what he said” and that he had come to believe that Hitler “was telling thetruth” and that he had “formed the opinion that Hitler’s objectives were strictly limited.”
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As history dictates, Chamberlain was wrong
// opravdu lze jeste verit, ze Mnichovska dohoda byl jen nejaky omyl? i nemecti generalove chteli bojovat proti Hitlerovi.. ale Britanie se rozhodla pomahat Hitlerovi a duverovat mu, odvratli se od spojencu i od opakovanych nabidek z nemecke armady, ze jsou ready Hitlera svrhnout, a ze chteji jen ujisteni od Britu, ze by v tom nezustali sami... a aby Britanie rekla verejne neco oskliveho o Hitlerovi..
Vetsina Nemcu byla podle tehle informaci proti Hitlerovi.. vojensky na tom nebylo Nemecky dobre ani ekonomicky, aby byl k ustupkum duvod. podle informaci, ktere byly zname uz v te dobe dle zachovalych zaznamu.
misto pomoci od nemecke armady s ni nakonec museli bojovat. a s ceskymi zbranemi, ktery tu nacisti pak ziskali. ceskym prumyslem na sve strane
konspiracni teorie, ze nekteri vysoce postaveni Britove byli na strane Hitlera pusobi celkem duveryhodne. oficialni verze chybneho usudku uz moc ne.