Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time is a work of history written by former Georgetown University professor and historian Carroll Quigley. The book covers the period of roughly 1880 to 1963 and is multidisciplinary in nature though perhaps focusing on the economic problems brought about by the First World War and the impact these had on subsequent events. While global in scope, the book focuses on Western civilization.

The book has attracted the attention of those interested in geopolitics due to Quigley's assertion that a secret society initially led by Cecil Rhodes, Alfred Milner and others had considerable influence over British and American foreign policy in the first half of the twentieth century. From 1909 to 1913, Milner organized the outer ring of this society as the semi-secret Round Table groups.[1]

The book is written based on archived files from the Council on Foreign Relations.

Faculty Corner
The Courier, December 12, 1952



For the Faculty Corner this week, the Courier has been fortunate in obtaining permission to print an exchange of correspondence between Mr. Jay Burke, a student in the Georgetown College of Arts and Sciences, and Dr. Carroll Quigley of the School of Foreign Service. We are indebted to both parties for this permission.





Dr. Carroll Quigley
Department of History, School of Foreign Service


My dear Dr. Quigley:

My name is Jay Burke and I am a student at Georgetown University. I am writing in regard to a discussion I have had with a student of yours, James Dowling. It is his assertion that prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1939, at the time Germany took over Czechoslovakia, Germany had only 36 incomplete divisions while Czechoslovakia had 35 complete and well trained divisions. In Dowling's own words, "The Czech troops were ordered out of the trenches," shortly before the treacherous invasion of the Germans.

Obviously the Czech army was more potent than the German army. If this is so, why was Germany able to conquer Czechoslovakia so easily, and why didn't the Czechs resist?

It is my contention that Germany had more than 36 incomplete divisions to conquer a country of 35 complete divisions. Mr. Dowling contends that Germany had but 36 divisions plus their reserves.

Would you please give us the truth of the matter?

Respectfully yours,

Jay Burke




Mr. Jay Burke
Box 113, Georgetown University
Washington 7, D.C.


My dear Mr. Burke,

Mr. Dowling's statement, regarding the size of the German Army at the time of the Munich crisis of September 1938, is quite accurate. In the third week of September Czechoslovakia had a million men and thirty-four first-rate divisions under arms. The Germans, in the course of September, increased their mobilization to thirty-one and ultimately to thirty-six divisions; but this probably represented a smaller force than the Czechs, as many of the nineteen first-line divisions were at two-thirds strength, the other third having been withdrawn to form the nucleus for the reserve divisions. Of the nineteen first-line divisions, three were armored and four were motorized. Only five divisions were left on the French frontier, in order to defeat Czechoslovakia as quickly as possible. France, which did not mobilize completely, had the Maginot Line completely manned on a war basis plus more than twenty infantry divisions. Moreover, France had available ten motorized divisions. Finally, Russia had ninety-seven divisions and, according to a letter from President Benes to Professor L. B. Namier on 20 April, 1944, Russia insisted on a policy of resistance to Germany's demands in September, 1938. (See L.B. Namier, Europe in Decay, London, 1950. p. 284.)

In air power, the Germans had a slight edge in average quality, but in number of planes it was far inferior. Moreover, Britain was just beginning to obtain delivery planes of quality far superior to those of Germany. In September, 1938, Germany had about 1,500 planes, while Czechoslovakia had less than 1,000; France and England together had over 1,000; Russia was reported to have 5,000, mostly of poor quality, but some of high quality. During the crisis, Russia gave thirty-six of its best planes to Czechoslovakia, flying them across Rumania.

In tanks, Germany was far inferior in quality in September, 1938. At that time, Germany's tanks were all below ten tons (Mark II) and were armed with machine guns, except for a handful of eighteen ton tanks (Mark III) armed with a 37 mm. gun. The Czechs had hundreds of thirty- eight ton tanks armed with 75 mm. cannon. When Germany overran Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, it captured 469 of these superior tanks along with 1,500 planes, 43,500 machine guns, over one million rifles, and a magnificent system of fortifications. From every point of view, this was little less than Germany had at Munich, and, at Munich, if the British government had desired it, Germany (with the possible assistance of Poland and Hungary) would have been opposed by Czechoslovakia supported by France, Britain, and Russia.

Before leaving this subject, it might be mentioned that Germany, in 1939, brought into production a Mark IV tank of twenty-three tons armed with a 75 mm. cannon but obtained only a handful of these by the outbreak of war. Up to that date (September, 1939), Germany had obtained delivery of only 300 Mark III and Mark IV tanks together. In addition, it had obtained, by the same date, 2,700 of the inferior Mark I and Mark II tanks which suffered break-downs of as much as twenty-five per cent a week. Even in 1939 Germany's production of tanks was less than Britain's. In the first nine months of 1939, Germany produced only fifty tanks a month; in the last four months of 1939, in wartime, Germany produced 247 "tanks and self-propelled guns" compared to British production of 314 tanks in the same period. From 1936 to the outbreak of war in 1939, German aircraft production was not raised but averaged 425 planes a month of all types (including commercial planes). This gave Germany an air force of 1,000 bombers and 1,050 fighters of varying quality in September, 1939. In contrast with this, the British air program of March, 1934 provided for a first-line R.A.F. of 900 planes. This was later increased, at Chamberlain's urging, and the program at May, 1938 planned for a first line force of 2,370 planes. This was increased again in 1939. Under it, Britain produced almost 3,000 "military" planes in 1938 and about 8,000 in 1939. Because of differences in categories between "planes," "military planes," and "combat planes," it is not possible to make any exact comparison of air strength between Britain and Germany, but it is clear that Britain's planes in 1939 and 1940 were more recent and of superior quality than Germany's. It was this superiority which made it possible for Britain to defeat Germany in the "Battle of Britain" in September, 1940.

The above figures are derived from various sources, mostly official documents. Obviously, the best source for figures on the German Army are in the papers of the German Ministry of War which were captured by the American Army in 1945. At the order of the Secretary of War (Stimson) these archives were studied from this point of view by Major General C.F. Robinson. General Robinson's report, dated 15 October, 1947, is available under the title Foreign Logistical Organizations and Methods (210 pages). At the time I saw this, it was a classified document, and, even now, you may have difficulty obtaining a copy. If so, you will find its contents on this topic summarized in B. Kain's "Germany's Preparation for War," American Economic Review XXXVIII (March 1948), pp. 56-77. These figures on the relative strengths of the German and French armies have recently been supported completely by the French parliamentary investigation into the causes of the 1940 defeat. That the British government was familiar with the situation clear from the recently published papers of the Foreign Office of Great Britain, E.L. Woodward, ed., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, third series, 5 volumes so far published covering 1937-1939. Nevertheless, at that time and since, prominent British political personages such as Lord Halifax, Churchill, and J. Wheeler-Bennett have tried to convey the impression that Germany had overwhelming military force in 1937-1940. This impression has, unfortunately, been generally accepted in America. From the published British documents we can see that the British military attachés in Paris and in Prague protested at the time against this misrepresentation. The most influential element in this campaign of misrepresentation was a statement from Charles A. Lindbergh, issued in Paris at the height of the Czechoslovak crisis, that Germany had 8,000 military planes and could build 1,500 a month. We now know that Germany at that time had 1,500 planes, had built 280 a month in 1938, and had abandoned all plans to bomb London even in a full-scale war because of lack of planes and distance from the target. Lindbergh repeated his talk of woe in London, and the British Government drove its own people to the verge of hysteria by frantically distributing gas-masks, digging worthless slit-trenches in London parks, and releasing rumors of a grave lack of aircraft defenses. Although Lord Halifax, Churchill, and others were informed, about 5 September, 1938, by representatives of the German General Staff and of the German Foreign Office that Hitler would be assassinated by them as soon as he gave the order to attack Czechoslovakia, the British yielded to Hitler and sent ultimatums to Czechoslovakia, to do the the same (See Documents, II, Appendix, and H. Rothfels, The German Opposition to Hitler, Hinsdale, Illinois, 1948, pp. 58-63 and elsewhere). The assassination plot, accordingly, was cancelled at noon on 28 September, 1938. Winston Churchill has continually misrepresented the degree of German armaments and was challenged on this issue by Hanson Baldwin, military critic of The New York Times in that paper on 9 May, 1938. J.W. Wheeler-Bennett in his book, Munich (New York, 1948), says, "By the close of 1937 Germany's preparedness for war was complete... Her rearmament had reached its apogée and could hold that peak level for a certain time..." etc., etc. Mr. Wheeler-Bennett, Britain's outstanding authority on international documentation, was a high official in the Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office during the War, and was, when he wrote his book, the British editor of the captured archives of the German Foreign Ministry. His statements, so far as I know, have never been publicly challenged, and his book is widely accepted as a standard work today. Its interpretation is not supported by the documents which have been published since he wrote, including those published by his organization under the title Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, from the Archives of the German Foreign Ministry. Volume II, Germany and Czechoslovakia, 1937-1938, (Washington, 1950).

The Czechs did not resist in September 1938, as a consequence of a series of ultimatums from London and Paris which stated that if they did not yield they would fight alone. Benes was apparently afraid that if he resisted, he would be supported by Russia; would be attacked simultaneously by Germany, Hungary, and Poland; would be denounced as "a spear-head of Bolshevism in Central Europe" (as he was even after he yielded); and that Britain and France would send aid to Germany to order to drive Germany into a war with the Soviet Union. Since Britain and France did try to attack Russia in January-February, 1940 (at a time when they were technically at war with Germany) and were prevented only by Swedish resistance, there may have been some validity in Benes' fears. On this last point see the documents published by the Swedish Foreign Ministry Forspelet till det tyska angreppet pa Danmark ich Norge den 9 April 1940 (Stockholm, 1947) pp. 153 and 235-236. My own opinion is that if Benes had resisted Germany in 1938 and Germany had attacked, either Hitler would have been removed by his generals or public opinion in France and England would have forced these governments to declare war on Germany. However, none of us knows what might have happened. I assure you it is difficult enough, in the face of propaganda from all sides, to determine what did happen.

Sincerely,

Carroll Quigley

Pushing Czechoslovakia to commit suicide
At the same time, France and Britain ordered the Czech government not to mobilize its troops for fear of provoking Germany, and pressured them to accept the Anglo-French solution to the crisis. But the Anglo-French proposal would further weaken Czechoslovakia’s security in exchange for vague promises of international guarantees. The government of President Edvard Beneš protested vigorously and rejected the solution. In their turn, London and Paris rejected the Czech refusal and mounted further pressure on the Czechs. Chamberlain explained the imperative to force Czechoslovakia’s government to yield: “The idea of territorial cession would be likely to have a more favorable reception from the British public if it could be represented as the choice of the Czechoslovak Government themselves and it could be made clear that they had been offered the choice of a plebiscite or of territorial cession and had preferred the latter. This would dispose of any idea that we were ourselves carving up Czechoslovak territory.” To turn up the pressure, France threatened to revoke their alliance and abandon the Czechs to Germany. Finally, on 21 September 1938 the Czech government relented and accepted the Anglo-French dictate.



Back in London, on 23rd September the British Cabinet overtly rejected Hitler’s Godesberg ultimatum and agreed to support France if it chose to go to war against Germany. The French government also rejected Hitler’s ultimatum as did the Czechs. The Soviets responded by explicitly reiterating their security commitment to Czechoslovakia. However, this last-moment appearance of a united front against an aggressive Germany finally shaping up was yet another deception.

Chamberlain’s perfidious double game
On 27 September 1938, Chamberlain delivered a radio address to the nation feigning his dismay at the incomprehensible events on the continent: “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing…” The very same day, Chamberlain sent a telegram to Czechoslovakia’s President Beneš, warning him that if he failed to accept Hitler’s ultimatum by 2 PM on the following day (28 September), Czechoslovakia would be overrun by the German Army and nothing could save her. After that he sent a message to Hitler to propose holding a four-power conference and reassuring him that Britain and France would force Czechoslovakia to accept any agreement, on condition that Germany abstained from going to war.



Then German troops overran Czechoslovakia, they captured 469 tanks which were much superior to German tanks, along with 1,500 planes, 43,000 machine guns, and over 1 million rifles. The unused arsenal was a posthumous testament to the power that failed to defend itself against Hitler’s aggression. It was sedated and paralyzed through the devious activities by Neville Chamberlain and his cabal.

...

In May 1939, Bank of England’s Montagu Norman turned over to Germany the £6,000,000 in Czech gold reserves held in London. When the news of this transfer leaked out, the cabinet hid behind the preposterous excuse that the British government could not give orders to the Bank of England.

The sacrifice of Czechoslovakia
The treacherous sacrifice of Czechoslovakia to Germany is one of the least well understood episodes leading to the tragedy of World War lI. Conventional history associates the Czech crisis with Neville Chamberlain’s appeasement at Munich. The story we were taught in school was that the British government agreed to partition Czechoslovakia only as a desperate measure to avoid a greater European war. This view is based on the idea that Germany was already an overwhelming military power that could easily crush Czechoslovakia’s weak defenses. However, this idea is patently false. In late 1938 Czechoslovakia did in fact capitulate without resistance, but this was not because her defenses were weak. Rather, Czechoslovakia’s government was paralyzed and sedated as a result of the treacherous scheming of Britain’s secret diplomacy.

The beginnings of the Czech crisis
Created in 1919, Czechoslovakia was the most prosperous, most democratic, most powerful and best administered of the states that emerged from the Habsburg Empire. Situated along its northwest frontier with Germany, the Sudeten region was the most industrialized part of the country and had a majority German population. Although Czechoslovakia instituted equitable treatment for all of its minorities, in the 1930s, Sudeten Germans began to press for greater political power and autonomy within Czechoslovakia. They established their own Nazi party and with funding from Berlin their relentless agitation and propaganda became a destabilizing factor for the nation.


In 1934 the Czech government finally banned the party, but under Konrad Henlein’s leadership, they merely changed the party’s name to Sudeten German Party and continued to consolidate influence and power. Henlein coordinated his party’s agenda with Hitler and their strategy was to keep pressing the Czech government for ever greater concessions which escalated the crisis to a boiling point in1938.

The school curriculum vs. the truth

Conventional history holds that Britain only became involved in this crisis in order to prevent a greater war from erupting. The Wikipedia entry says that, “Germany had started a low-intensity undeclared war on Czechoslovakia on 17 September 1938. In reaction, the United Kingdom and France on 20 September formally asked Czechoslovakia to cede its territory to Germany…” That pretty much sums up history as it is still being taught in schools everywhere. The truth is very different: as early as March 1938 and until the very end, British representatives took a very active role in the negotiations between the Germans and the Czech government.

Behind the false cloak of impartiality, the British representatives consistently bolstered German demands and pressured the Czechs to yield. The Czech government responded by offering substantial concessions and formulating a plan for the minorities that included economic benefits, cultural and administrative autonomy and even political federalism. This was however brushed aside by the German and British counterparts as inadequate. Then, on 24 April 1938, Henlein formulated the extreme “Karlsbad Demands.” After months of torturous negotiations, and under severe pressure from Britain, in September 1938 the Czech government yielded on most of these demands. But at that point, rather than declaring victory and accepting a settlement, Henlein abruptly broke off the negotiations and fled to Germany.

The balance of military power
History regards Chamberlain’s 1938 appeasement of Hitler as an ill-advised and cowardly policy, but ultimately a justifiable, or at least well-intentioned bid to prevent a greater European war. The Czech situation was invariably presented as a lost cause since the overwhelming power of the German Wehrmacht could easily crush Czechoslovakia’s weak defenses. But the ideas that the Germans had a military advantage and that Czech’s security was weak were both fabrications of a sustained propaganda campaign, which was orchestrated by the British media and government representatives to mislead the British and European public.

To be sure, Germany had been building up its military power since the early 1930s, but in 1938 it was still no match for Czech defenses: the Germans had 35 infantry divisions and only 4 motorized divisions, none of them fully manned or equipped. Of these, only 22 partially trained divisions were stationed near the Czech frontier. At the same time, Czechoslovakia had 34 well equipped divisions and was able to mobilize and arm fully 1,000,000 troops. While all of Germany’s tanks were below 10 tons (except for a handful of Mark III 18-ton tanks) and armed with 37-mm guns, the Czech army had hundreds of 38-ton tanks armed with 75-mm cannons.


Moreover Czech army was better trained, had very high morale and had built powerful fortifications along its borders. In terms of quality, armaments and fortifications, the Czech army was known to be the best in Europe and was superior to German army in every way except for air support. On September 3rd 1938 the British military attaché in Prague wrote a cable to London, stating: “There are no shortcomings in the Czech army, as far as I have been able to observe…” In addition, Czech security was supported by strategic alliances with France and the Soviet Union both of whom were at that time very keen on holding Germany in check and both of whom were significantly superior to Germany in terms of military strength



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