TUHO: tldr pro Rusko by se do roku 2030 zas tolik nemenilo, ale potom by jeho vliv sel dramaticky do kopru, protoze Evropa je pro nej hlavni odbytistie fosilnich paliv... Zaroven je pro Rusko dost likvidacni uhlikovy clo, zaroven nema zadny kredibilni plany na low-carbon prechod.

A jeste neco o geopolitickem dopadu green dealu... (vybrana pasaz o Rusku). Take paper z doby pred invazi. #geopolitika

In context, the Green Deal could have a major impact on Russia. In 2016, oil and gas revenues contributed 36 percent of the country’s government budget13 and Europe absorbed 75 percent of Russian natural gas exports and 60 percent of its crude oil exports14. Over the next decade, the EU-Russia oil and gas trade will not be substantially impacted, as Europe would only marginally reduce its oil and gas imports by 2030 even in a 55 percent emissions reduction scenario (see section 2), but the situation will radically change after 2030 when Europe is expected to substantially reduce its oil and gas imports. The EU will possibly shift from suppliers such as Russia where extraction is emissions-intensive to suppliers such as Saudi Arabia where extraction has roughly half the carbon footprint it has in Russia15.
Moreover, a carbon border adjustment mechanism (on EU imports other than oil and gas) would also reduce Russian goods exports as they tend to be very carbon intensive (Makarov and Sokolova, 2017). It is not clear how much Russia will seek to resist these efforts. Ruslan Edelgeriev (Putin’s climate adviser) told companies in February 2020 to prepare for the EU border tax, noting that “the EU wants to push through these regulations not because they don’t like our companies, but so that their own companies don’t overstep emissions targets”16. Russia’s inefficient energy system implies many opportunities to reduce carbon intensity in its economy. There is ample scope for European cooperation with Russia on increasing the use of renewables, reducing methane leakage and boosting energy efficiency.

https://www.bruegel.org/sites/default/files/wp_attachments/PC-04-GrenDeal-2021-1.pdf

Geopolitics of Electricity: Grids, Space and (political) Power

Although electricity grids shape and define both political and economic
spaces, the geopolitical significance of electricity remains underestimated.
In political communities and beyond, such grids establish new channels
for projecting geopolitical influence and new spheres of influence.
∎ In the Europe-Asia continental area, integrated electricity grids meet interconnectors – that is, cross-border transmission lines linking different electric grids. Interconnectors define new, partly competing vectors of integration that extend beyond already integrated electricity grids.
∎ In this context, it is attractive for non-EU states to belong to the electricity
system of continental Europe. This is because interconnected synchronous
systems form “grid communities” that share a “common destiny” – not
only in terms of electricity supply but also in terms of security and welfare.
∎ Germany and the EU must develop an electricity foreign policy in order
to optimise, modernise, strengthen and expand the European electricity
grid. Above all, however, Germany and the EU should help shape interconnectivity beyond the EU’s common integrated electricity grid.
∎ China is gaining considerable influence in the electricity sector, setting
standards and norms as well as expanding its strategic outreach – to the
benefit of its own economy. Its efforts are part of Beijing’s larger Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), an attempt to reorient global infrastructure and
commercial flows.
∎ In the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, geopolitical issues have dominated
the configuration of electricity grids since the end of the Cold War. There
is unmistakable competition over integration between the EU and Russia.
∎ The eastern Mediterranean region, the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions,
and Central Asia are, each in their own way, changing from peripheral
zones into interconnecting spaces. The EU, China, Russia and – across
the Black Sea – Iran and Turkey are competing in these zones to influence the reconfiguration of electricity grids. And in South and Southeast
Asia, India’s influence is on the rise

https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2022RP06_GeopoliticsOfElectricity.pdf

TUHO: versus dovozni zavislost na Rusku CR

https://www.mpo.cz/assets/cz/energetika/statistika/energeticke-bilance/2022/3/Dovozni-zavislost-CR-2010-2020.pdf

TUHO:

A jeste ke geopolitice a vztahu Nemecko / Rusko clanek z roku 2019


Moscow’s position vis-à-vis the climate agreements has always been ambivalent. Yet it was instrumental in the Kyoto Protocol coming into force. Russia
signed the Paris Agreement in 2015 and formally joined in autumn 2019 (Reuters,
2019). On the one hand, the country is not only the fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases, but also a major fossil fuel exporter. On the other, Russia argues that
its energy mix is relatively clean and that emissions have decreased significantly
in the 1990s. Beyond that, increased climate ambitions and dedicated actions can
be seen as a blow to the Russian economic model, but also as a development that
lessens Russia’s geopolitical influence.
Berlin in turn has embarked on the Energiewende. A“Green Energy Transition“
has been on the German political agenda since the 1980s, but has become an
explicit part of policies with the Energy Concept of 2010, which were revised in
2011 under the impact of Fukushima and accomplished by a nuclear phase-out
by 2022. This article explores how the German (and EU) energy transformation
has affected the German–Russian gas relations and takes a long-term perspective
to explore how the alliance evolved and changed, how the underlying paradigms
and notions have been adapted over time and, last but not least, how (power)
relations have been affected by that.

German–Russian gas relations in face of the energy transition
https://rujec.org/article/55478/

YMLADRIS:

Jozef Pecho
https://www.facebook.com/1678732617/posts/10218977439221803/

Som celkom prekvapený, že dlhodobé prognostické modely NOAA a BOM (prekvapujúco aj ECMWF) už teraz signalizujú potenciálny a veľmi rýchly nástup El Niňa (teplej fázy ENSO) v priebehu leta 2023 (JJA). Pochopiteľne, vzhľadom na pomerne veľké prognostické "okno" (>6 mesiacov) to môže skončiť pri tom, že chladná fáza ENSO (La Niňa) bude pokračovať aj naďalej, už štvrtý rok po sebe, alebo budú podmienky blízke neutrálnym (čo je z dnešného pohľadu najviac pravdepodobné).

Ak by sa súčasné odhady predsa len potvrdili a v priebehu roka 2023 by El Niňo skutočne prišlo, prípadne by bolo aj silné (podobne ako v rokoch 2015/16), existuje reálna možnosť, že v rokoch 2024-25 globálna teplota (GT) dosiahne, resp. presiahne hranicu 1,5 °C oteplenia. Zatiaľ by to bolo len na úrovni ročného priemeru GT, no aj tak by to znamenalo, že by sme prvý krát "okúsili", čo to znamená žiť na Zemi za hranicou "veľmi nebezpečnej zmeny klímy". Rozsah prejavov a negatívnych dôsledkov by bol v takom prípade bezprecedentný! Ani to nebudeme všetko stíhať sledovať. Môže sa to celé nakoniec veľmi rýchlo zvrtnúť do kaskádových zmien (tipping points overshoot), ktoré zmenia životné prostredie na celej Zemi na "nepoznanie" ( https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-022-01545-9 alebo https://www.pik-potsdam.de/en/news/latest-news/overshooting-climate-targets-could-significantly-increase-risk-for-tipping-cascades ).

Len pripomínam, že hranicu 1,5 °C sme na úrovni mesačnej odchýlky GT presiahli vo februári 2016 (na celej Zemi sme vtedy, okrem iného, pozorovali aj nevídane rýchle bielenie - úhyn - tropických koralov; https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-04660-w).

Zdroje:
https://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/analysis_monitoring/lanina/enso_evolution-status-fcsts-web.pdf [NOAA]

http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/enso/#tabs=Pacific-Ocean&pacific=Forecast [BOM]