• úvod
  • témata
  • události
  • tržiště
  • diskuze
  • nástěnka
  • přihlásit
    registrace
    ztracené heslo?
    TUHOKlimaticka zmena / If the fracturing of our once stable climate doesn’t terrify you, then you don’t fully understand it


    "Given the sheer enormity of climate change, it’s okay to be depressed, to grieve. But please, don’t stay there too long. Join me in pure, unadulterated, righteous anger."


    "I don’t want your hope. I don’t want you to be hopeful. I want you to panic. I want you to feel the fear I feel every day. And then I want you to act. Once you start to act, the hope is everywhere."

    "Our best scientists tell us insistently that a calamity is unfolding, that the life-support systems of the Earth are being damaged in ways that threaten our survival. Yet in the face of these facts we carry on as usual."

    “We’ve got to stop burning fossil fuels. So many aspects of life depend on fossil fuels, except for music and love and education and happiness. These things, which hardly use fossil fuels, are what we must focus on.”

    A nejde o to, že na to nemáme dostatečné technologie, ty by na řešení použít šly, ale chybí nám vůle a představivost je využít. Zůstáváme při zemi, přemýšlíme až moc rezervovaně. Technologický pokrok to sám o sobě nevyřeší. Problém jsme my, ne technologické nástroje.

    Rostouci hladiny oceanu, zmena atmosferickeho proudeni, zmeny v distribuci srazek a sucha. Zmeny karbonoveho, fosforoveho a dusikoveho cyklu, okyselovani oceanu. Jake jsou bezpecnostni rizika a jake potencialni klady dramatickych zmen fungovani zemskeho systemu?
    Ale take jak funguji masove dezinformacni kampane ropneho prumyslu a boj o verejne mineni na prahu noveho klimatickeho rezimu post-holocenu.
    rozbalit záhlaví
    TUHO
    TUHO --- ---
    YMLADRIS: Mozna te spatne chapu, ale tak imho tam dlouho jsme. Napriklad viz RCP a pozdeji SSP scenare IPCC.

    Shared Socioeconomic Pathways - Wikipedia
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shared_Socioeconomic_Pathways

    Plus IPCC ma k tomu nekolik 2 tisice stran dlouhou zpravu, to mi prijde celkem dost

    Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change
    The Working Group III report provides an updated global assessment of climate change mitigation progress and pledges, and examines the sources of global emissions. It explains developments in emission reduction and mitigation efforts, assessing the impact of national climate pledges in relation to long-term emissions goals.

    https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_FullReport.pdf
    SHEFIK
    SHEFIK --- ---
    GB/UK nova vlada a jejich vladni energeticka firma

    As the Climate Change Committee (CCC) recently made clear, there is one obvious answer to preventing us being so exposed again – a sprint for homegrown clean energy. As it said in its progress report to parliament last week: “British-based renewable energy is the cheapest and fastest way to reduce vulnerability to volatile global fossil-fuel markets. The faster we get off fossil fuels, the more secure we become.”

    Within a week of coming to power, the new government lifted the onshore windfarms ban, appointed the former head of the CCC, Chris Stark, to drive forward that clean-energy target, announced a rooftop solar-panel revolution and established a new national wealth fund with the chancellor for green investment.
    Today, we take the next steps. What was also clear from the election is how much the British people understood the case for Great British Energy, our new publicly owned energy company. In post-election polling by the organisation More in Common, Great British Energy enjoyed the support of 73% of all voters and 56% of 2024 Conservative voters.

    Great British Energy is becoming a reality – bringing with it cheap, clean and secure energy | Energy | The Guardian
    https://amp.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/jul/25/great-british-energy-ed-miliband-labour-clean-power
    CHOSIE
    CHOSIE --- ---
    SHEFIK:
    o jeho podcenovani covidu toho moc nevim, nicmene to je zase cernobila zkratka :) zadny clovek nema ultimatni pravdu ve vsem, nebo patent na rozum.

    Tím jsem jen zmínil proč se mi to jméno vybavilo, to že má vaznost na uhelný a ropný průmysl a vznesl dosti pochybné tvrzení, které zní jak z knihy climate deniers jsou o dost větší red flags, zároveň s tím, že nemá ani akademickou vazbu, dle wiki je "science writer, journalist and businessman" (a libertarian, another red flag). Proč si raději neposlechnout antropology, klimatology, ekology, aj.?

    The Man Who Wants to Northern Rock the Planet

    Matt Ridley accused of lobbying UK government on behalf of coal industry

    Souhlasím s tím, že nějakého zjednodušení se člověk dopustit musí, pakliže pokrývá multidisciplinární tématiku a snaží se ji nějak shrnout, sám několik takových autorů sleduji a myslím, že je to potřeba, protože žádné téma a věda neexistuje ve vákuu.
    Za mě dost dobrá kniha, která zahrnuje všemožná témata a problémy:

    Reality Blind: Integrating the Systems Science Underpinning Our Collective Futurest
    Uvadis kolik lidi upozornilo na to, ze co2 dokaze atmosferu ohrat, ale to nikdo, ani ja v mych prispevcich nerozporuju. Zaroven se ti nepovedlo odpovedet ani na jednu z mych otazek :)
    Snažil jsem se odpovědět s myšlenkou, že se bavíme o rozmachu průmyslového zemědělství a věcí s ním spjatých a reagoval tím, že tyto témata a teorie započaly před ním.

    Otázky níže jsou velmi obecné, takže nevím z jakého úhlu a perspektivy vycházíe, ale pokusím se.
    Myslis, ze pokud bychom negenerovali prebytky, byli bychom si zmeny klimatu vedomi?
    V rámci generací si lidstvo změn všímat může, nicméně pokud půjdeme k morku kosti, tak přebytek nám obecně poskytl všechny možné příležitosti a možnosti. Ani jednou jsem v předešlé konverzaci nic proti tomu nenamítal, nebo netvrdil opak, takže netuším proč se na to vůbec ptáš. Nicméně když už tě to tak zajímá.
    Je také rozdíl mezi tím, obstarat potravu tak rychle/nenáročně, že má člověk čas navíc (zjednodušeně), nebo mít fosilní paliva, kde barel ropy je schopen nahradit 6 let fyzické práce jednoho člověka, která navrch nahodnocujeme pouze dle ceny extrakce/zpracování.

    Z jíného úhlu mohu také říct, že nebýt oněch přebytků (v podobě fosilní energie) tak by ona změna klimatu na steroidech vedena antropogenními emisemi neprobíhala, takže bych také mohl odpovědět "nebýt přebytků nebylo by co vnímat". Nicméně jsem názoru založeného na ekologických teoriích a poznáních (např. tzv. maximum power principle, ecological overshoot..), že by lidstvo klima v dlouhodobém meřítku tak či onak ovlivnilo, pokud by nedošlo k zásadním změnám v tom jak funguje (tzn. pokud by lidstvo pokračovalo tak dál, jen neobjevilo fosilní paliva), ale to už bych hodně teoretizoval.
    byli bychom ji schopni pokrocile merit?
    Hádám, že se odkazujeme na přebytek, zodpovězeno v otázce výše,
    byli bychom o ni schopni komunikovat na celoplanetarni urovni s takovym zasahem?
    Hádám, že se odkazujeme na přebytek, zodpovězeno v otázce výše.
    Zde jsem zmínil hlavně to, že komunikujeme přes 50 let, ale nevím kde je ten "zásah", nebo změna směru. Zároveň nemůžu říct, že je to chyba někoho konkrétního, jako společnost si nějak definujeme naše cíle, málokdo se dobrovolně vzdá jákehokoliv pohodlí a jsem názoru, že fungujeme jako superorganismus a nikdo přímo nekoordinuje onen směr.
    Byli bychom schopni ji predikovat?
    Hádám, že se odkazujeme na přebytek, zodpovězeno v otázce výše.
    K predikcím a modelacím, ale mohu dodat, že je to něco do čeho bychom měli investovat mnohem více.

    Co je tedy tvá téze, sdílený článek bylo o tom, že dojde k vrcholu produkce potravin, zmíněn byl hlavně klimatický chaos, ale k tomu jsem dodal i absolutní závislost na neobnovitelných zdrojích - od samotné techniky, po hnojiva a další. Úbytku půdy, vody, znečištění, viz odkazy níže.
    Ty jsi navrhl, že v záloze je GMO, u kterého jsem uznal, že může být jakousi náplastí na střelnou ránu, ale to samotné krvácení to nezastaví.
    S tím jak popisuješ (soudě, dle té knihy) to jak lidstvo funguje a historicky se vyvýjí takhle obrazně zcela souhlasit nemohu, ale musel by ses víc rozepsat.

    ...jez je zalozena na prebytcich, ktere dale umoznuji specializaci, jez dale umoznuje vyssi efektivitu, tedy vice prebytku. Tzn. to kritizovani rustu a prebytku je ve svem principu uplne spatne, protoze prebytky jsou to, co lidstvu umoznilo dlouhodobe prezit a ziskat evolucni vyhodu, at uz v podobe zasob, vedeckeho poznani, nebo i kulturni evoluce.
    Tady se shodneme v rámci specializace, surplusu. Samotná efektivita je také sporná (viz Jevonsův paradox), ale záleží v jakém případě se o ni bavíme, avšak upřesním termín "růst" (protože růst může být spirituální, intelektuální, sociální aj.) na "ekonomický růst", který je takřka 1:1 spojený se spotřebou surovin a dalších zdrojů. Při 3% ročního růstu můžeme očekávat zdvojení spotřeby surovin a energie za ~24 let (viz exponenciální růst). Přebytek jsem jako takový nekritizoval, nicméně přebytek může existovat v absenci ekonomického růstu. Co bych kritizovat mohl je "overconsumption".

    The Limits to Growth

    A Synopsis: Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update

    Global Resources Outlook 2024

    Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary Change (kniha)

    The Sixth Extinction: An Unnatural History (kniha)

    Prosperity without Growth: Foundations for the Economy of Tomorrow (kniha)

    The decoupling delusion: rethinking growth and sustainability
    Ted sice dochazime k tomu, ze existuji v konkretnim case limity (energeticke, materialove), ale to neznamena, ze jsme doted delali vse spatne. Naopak, pokud bychom to tak nedelali, dost mozna by tu lidstvo nebylo (doba ledova, valky, neurody,...)
    Nevím kam přesně míříš s "doba ledova, valky, neurody" - války a konflikty tu byly a jsou (a počtem narůstají), neúrody tu byly a jsou (a momentálně i přes intenzivní zemědělství narůstají) - a dovolím si tvrdit, že na ještě více nestabilní planetě šance obou pouze narůstá, nemyslíš?

    Conflict Trends: A Global Overview, 1946–2022

    Uppsala Conflict Data Program

    Alert 2023! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding

    Projections constructed using an ensemble of 21 climate model simulations suggest that climate change could reduce global crop yields by 3–12% by mid-century and 11–25% by century's end.

    Neřekl jsem, že jsme vše dělali špatně (i když mnohé ano). Téma bylo o industrializaci zemědělství a že nám pomohla předejít (krátkodobě) problémy s dostatkem jídla, ale ona industrializace přinesla i mnoho negativních důsledků, včetně degradace půdy, ztráty biodiverzity a znečištění životního prostředí a dalšího jež jsem zmínil níže, a moje další téze byla, že GMO není univerzálním řešením a nemůže kompenzovat všechny ekologické problémy spojené se současným zemědělstvím. Energetické a materiálové limity jsou celkem zásadní, ve světě poháněném onou energií a postaveném na oněch materiálech, ještě k tomu v nastavení, kdy se jimi plýtvá jako dnes.

    World Scientists' Warning to Humanity: A Second Notice

    LIVING PLANET REPORT 2022

    Global Assessment Report on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services

    The State of the Birds Report 2022

    Planetary boundaries (9 boundaries assessed, 6 crossed)

    More losers than winners: investigating Anthropocene defaunation through the diversity of population trends

    FAO warns 90 per cent of Earth’s topsoil at risk by 2050

    A World Without Soil: The Past, Present, and Precarious Future of the Earth Beneath Our Feet

    pokud se budem zabejvat jen idealnim stavem a jeho statutem quo, pak si muzem rovnou usetrit spoustu casu, protoze nic takovyho jako vesmirny equilibrium neexistuje
    Souhlasím s tím, že ideální stav není dosažitelný, ale to neznamená, že bychom neměli brát v úvahu ekologické limity a hledat udržitelnější alternativy.
    Tvrdis, ze statisticky kvalita zivota neni lepsi, jenze se k tomu daj krasne sledovat parametry jako je prumerny vek doziti, novorozenecka mortalita atd. Pro me sou tyhle parametry baseline. Jestli mas nejake jine, lepsi, nasdilej.
    Z hlediska statistiky může být průměrný věk dožití a novorozenecká mortalita jedním z ukazatelů kvality života, ale není to jediné měřítko, nicméně k tomu:

    Snížená mortalita dětí do 5 let je skvělý úspěch, proti tomu nic neříkám, a celkově je zrovna zdravotnictví/sanitace/.. něco co nekritizuji.

    Dále k průměrnému věku, ten byl historicky dost zkreslen právě novorozeneckou mortalitou, průměry, které nezapočítavají děti odhalují, že se lidé běžně dožívali relativně vysokého věku. Následně, za jakých podmínek se dnes lidé dožívají vysokého věku? Nutnost 24/7 péče, na přístrojích,.. také proto vidíme debaty na téma eutanázie, a celkově jsme jako společnost posedlí tím neumřít, ale přijde mi, že se přehlíží kvalita života, kterou se snažíme dohánět materiálně, neúspěšně.

    Old age isn’t a modern phenomenon – many people lived long enough to grow old in the olden days, too

    Dalšími měřítky, které nemůžeme ignorovat je kvalita životního prostředí, sociální rovnost a celková udržitelnost společnosti. Opět dodám důraz na životní prostředí, vyměnit biosféru a relativně stabilní planetu za století prosperity nezní jako dobrý obchod. Lidí s nedostatkem jídla/vody též přibývá.

    2024 Social Progress Index

    The Lancet Countdown on health and climate change

    The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2023

    Adaptation Gap Report 2023

    Global Risks Report 2024

    A Short History of Progress

    Jak jsem zmínil, na profilu mám řadu zdrojů. Mohu doporučit něco konkrétního máš-li konkrétní dotaz, ale bavíme se o několika tématech.
    Pokusil jsem se k popsaným tématům a tvrzením dodat nějaké zdroje.
    YMLADRIS
    YMLADRIS --- ---
    If Americans elect Biden, the United States could very likely reach the emissions targets outlined in the Paris Agreement. If Trump is elected, the country is likely to emit 50% more greenhouse gasses by 2030, a difference of more than a billion tons of emissions per year, according to projections released by Carbon Brief this week.

    ...

    Trump leased 2.4 million acres for oil and gas production. By comparison, Biden’s administration leased 324,000 acres in its first two years. In other words, Trump leased 7 times more land to oil and gas companies than Biden.

    When Biden took office, he killed the Keystone XL project and blocked drilling permits in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.

    In his first term, Joe Biden has done more to address climate change than any President before him. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) alone is expected to wipe out 21 billion tons of planet-warming pollution between now and 2050.

    "Four years ago, if Biden had promised to do everything that he’s done during his first term, most pundits would have laughed him out of the room. Even after winning the 2020 election, passing any climate policy seemed unlikely. The Senate was split 50-50 and Joe Manchin—a literal coal baron—was the swing vote.

    Yet, the last four years unfolded in completely unexpected ways.

    For decades, environmental advocates have tried to convince lawmakers to pass even the most marginal climate policies. And they’ve failed. It wasn’t until Biden took office that the logjam broke and the climate policies flowed. Since then, America has experienced remarkable progress."

    What Americans Need to Hear About Biden's Climate Record
    https://www.distilled.earth/p/what-americans-need-to-hear-about

    --

    skoda ze si zvoli trumpa
    TADEAS
    TADEAS --- ---
    EU countries already hitting some of their sustainable energy targets for 2030 | Sustainable development goals | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/28/eu-countries-already-hitting-some-of-their-sustainable-energy-targets-for-2030

    Several European countries hit some of their sustainable energy targets for 2030 a decade early, a study has found, but big gaps remain across the board.

    Progress on SDG 7 achieved by EU countries in relation to the target year 2030: A multidimensional indicator analysis using dynamic relative taxonomy | PLOS ONE
    https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0297856
    TUHO
    TUHO --- ---
    YMLADRIS:
    ZAHRADKAR: ty zmeny jaou fakt masivni, jeste pred par lety ta trajektorie byla fakt na ceste worst-case scenarich… v poslednich let po masivnim tlaku (a imho fakt vcetne XR) se ta trajektorie lame. neni to asi tolik videt, peotoze vv mnoha ohledech ta zmena je pomala (a hlavne prichazi pozde), ale v tom delajmhorizontu je dramaticka a je tam

    Most people don’t realize how much progress we’ve made on climate change » Yale Climate Connections
    https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2023/11/most-people-dont-realize-how-much-progress-weve-made-on-climate-change/
    TUHO
    TUHO --- ---
    TUHO: People who write about climate change are accustomed to getting emails explaining why they are mistaken. The writer, often a retired engineer, sends a couple of pages of equations “proving” that adding carbon dioxide gas (CO2) to the atmosphere cannot cause global warming. Is there a simple physics model that shows in a transparent way how humanity’s emissions of gases do heat the planet? History offers an instructive approach to this question. When scientists attacked the problem, what mental obstacles did they encounter, and how were those overcome? Two centuries of effort, summarized below, concluded that greenhouse calculations require computer models far too complex to be understood intuitively—but simple, readily grasped observations show that the models’ conclusions are plausible.

    Intuitive models
    The struggle began in 1824 when Joseph Fourier, as a minor aside from his landmark contributions to the physics and mathematics of heat flow, published a speculation. He proposed (wrongly) that interplanetary space is inherently very cold, and he wondered why our Earth is not frozen. Perhaps our atmosphere retains heat like a blanket? He compared the air to a pane of glass covering a box: the glass lets sunlight in but stops heat (infrared) radiation from leaving. This would later be called the “greenhouse effect.” Not until 1909 did a physicist, Robert W. Wood, point out that the phrase is misleading; the main work of the glass in an actual greenhouse is to separate the warm air inside from the cold winds outside. Still, Fourier’s rudimentary model of the atmosphere raising Earth’s temperature by blocking outgoing infrared radiation sounded plausible.

    The idea got little traction. There was no actual evidence that Earth needed help in keeping warm, and anyway air seemed to be entirely transparent to radiation. But then geologists discovered the ice ages: a constant global temperature could no longer be taken for granted. Could an ice age be caused by a change in the composition of the atmosphere? John Tyndall decided to check that by devising an apparatus to measure the passage of infrared rays through gases. In 1859, he found that the main constituents of the atmosphere, nitrogen and oxygen, are indeed transparent—but water vapor, CO2, methane, and some other gases absorb infrared rays.

    How does that affect Earth’s climate? Tyndall, a superb science popularizer, came up with a simple model of the process that has never been bettered: “As a dam built across a river causes a local deepening of the stream, so our atmosphere, thrown as a barrier across the terrestrial [heat] rays, produces a local heightening of the temperature at the Earth’s surface.” A fine analogy—but understanding a process doesn’t signify much until you get numbers. How much would global temperature change if the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere changed?

    Calculating a number
    In 1896, after half a century of advances in infrared measurements, Svante Arrhenius attempted to quantify the greenhouse effect. He began with a short list of equations, the first real physics model. There was much to calculate. Adding CO2 at a given height in the atmosphere would absorb a certain amount of radiation and warm that level. But then the warmer air would hold more water vapor, itself a potent greenhouse gas. So that had to be calculated too. Arrhenius made a separate calculation for each band of latitude, noting that when the surface in northern latitudes grew warmer, it would retain less ice and snow, uncovering dark ocean and soil that would absorb additional heat. In the end, he spent a full year on pencil-and-paper computations. Yet it was a simple model; one modern microchip could do the calculation in a fraction of a second.

    Arrhenius announced that doubling the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere should warm the planet something like 4 °C. That was obviously only a rough estimate, but the exact number did not seem to matter much. At the rate that humanity was burning coal, Arrhenius figured it would take thousands of years to double the CO2.

    Other scientists soon decided that Arrhenius’s estimate was worthless. They were right, for as we will see, he left out factors that are crucial for climate. But their main argument was a simple one that apparently refuted the greenhouse effect altogether. A basic laboratory measurement indicated that doubling the CO2 in the atmosphere could make no difference at all. For in the broad bands of the infrared spectrum where CO2 acts to absorb radiation, there was already enough of the gas in the atmosphere to make the air utterly opaque: that part of the infrared spectrum was “saturated.”

    So matters stood until 1956, when Gilbert Plass took a fresh look at the greenhouse question. The laboratory measurement of CO2 that supposedly refuted Arrhenius had been done at sea-level pressure. That seemed reasonable when everyone looked at the atmosphere from the bottom up, as if it indeed acted like a solid slab of glass. But if you looked down from space, you would see infrared radiation coming mostly from the thin air near the top of the atmosphere—air that was heated by absorbing radiation from below. Drawing on decades of progress in theory and spectroscopy, Plass knew that in this thin air, the bands of infrared absorption resolve into a thicket of individual lines. Adding CO2 would broaden the lines, and they would absorb more radiation. The place from which heat radiation finally escaped into space would migrate to a higher level. Everything below would get warmer, as in Tyndall’s analogy of a dam.

    Even with the new digital computers, it was a huge job to calculate the effect, layer by layer through the atmosphere and point by point across the spectrum. Plass could model only a one-dimensional column of air, a simpler physical model than Arrhenius’s even as it required much more computation. Plass found that doubling the CO2 in his model did raise the temperature by a few degrees down to ground level: the greenhouse question was revived. However, he had left out so many things (water vapor, for one) that everyone knew the question was not answered. Indeed, when Fritz Möller tried the calculation including water vapor, he got an unreasonable surface temperature rise of 10 °C or more.

    Complete calculations
    Syukuro Manabe took up the challenge. His equations included a crucial process that almost everyone had overlooked: convection. Heat rises from Earth’s surface not only in radiation but in columns of air and moisture, carried skyward, for example, in thunderstorms. That is what prevents Möller’s runaway surface heating. Manabe’s model was in a sense still simple, equations that could be written down on a couple of pages. But he meticulously fed it the details of the actual infrared absorption and humidity at 18 levels of the atmosphere. Calculating it all just for a one-dimensional column of air still needed a state-of-the-art computer. In 1967, working with a collaborator, Manabe produced a simulated atmospheric profile that looked pretty much like the real one. Then, like Arrhenius and Plass, he doubled the CO2 level in his simulated atmosphere and calculated the change in surface temperature—a number that would be called the climate “sensitivity.” It was roughly 2 °C. The calculation was impressive, convincing many scientists that greenhouse warming was worth looking into. Yet Manabe’s model was clearly too simple. In particular, like everyone else, Manabe had left out a feature of climate that profoundly affects radiation: clouds.

    Over the next decade, leaps in computer power enabled Manabe and his collaborators to clone their one-dimensional column thousands of times to wrap a globe in three dimensions, and to incorporate clouds and other essential climate features. To get the pattern of cloudiness, they had to calculate how the atmosphere exchanges moisture with simplified sea, land, and ice surfaces, and how rain or snow falls on the surfaces and evaporates or runs off in rivers, and more. Then there were the oceans, with their own circulation transporting vast amounts of heat from the tropics toward the poles. In the end, Manabe produced a simulated planet with trade winds, tropical rain bands, deserts, ice caps, and so forth in all the right places. Finally, a model complicated enough to look like the real world! Doubling the CO2 got, again, a sensitivity of roughly 2 °C.

    Humanity was now burning fossil fuels an order of magnitude faster than in Arrhenius’s day. Measurements of the CO2 level in the atmosphere revealed it was rising fast. A doubling was not a thousand years off, but likely before the end of the 21st century. National policies for energy production might need to be reconsidered.

    The U.S. President’s Science Adviser, geophysicist Frank Press, heard of the problem. In 1979, he turned to the nation’s traditional provider of trustworthy science advice: the National Academy of Sciences. The Academy duly convened a panel to conduct a study. The panel ploughed through publications on a variety of rudimentary models like Plass’s. They interviewed Manabe at length about his 2 °C finding. And they interviewed James Hansen, the author of the only other big climate model at that time, which computed a sensitivity of 4 °C. The panel found it very probable that doubling CO2 would seriously heat the planet. Splitting the difference between Manabe and Hansen, they estimated the sensitivity would be 3 °C give or take 50%, that is, 1.5–4.5 °C.

    The Academy panel judged well. The scientific consensus today still puts the most likely sensitivity at 3 °C (a climate of severe global disruption). The range of uncertainty was not narrowed until 2021, when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change put the likely lower bound at 2 °C and the upper at 4 °C, although they could not rule out 5 °C (an unimaginable catastrophe). So there persists a disturbing uncertainty. The most advanced models, embodying orders of magnitude more features than Manabe’s, disagree among themselves. Climate is inextricably complicated. That raises a different and urgent question: can these models, far too elaborate to be grasped intuitively, be trusted at all?

    Verifying the number
    The first convincing answer came in 1985 from Vostok, Antarctica, where the Soviet Union drilled a hole kilometers deep into the ice cap. Tiny bubbles in the ice preserved ancient air with its CO2. The ratio of oxygen isotopes (18O/16O) in the ice measured the temperature of the clouds at the time the snow had fallen, for the warmer the air, the more of the heavier isotope got into the ice crystals. Analysis showed that through the coming and going of entire ice ages, temperature and CO2 had soared and plunged in lockstep. And the sensitivity? Doubled CO2 meant a temperature rise of … wait for it … 3 °C give or take 50%.

    In any field of science, when two utterly different approaches give you the same number, you can feel you are in touch with reality. Researchers took up the problem with other independent methods, working out ingenious ways to find temperature and CO2 in distant geological eras (for example, the density of pores in fossil leaves reflects the CO2 level of the air, as do carbon isotope ratios in carbonates precipitated in ancient soils, while oxygen isotope ratios in shells in seabed sediments vary with the ocean surface temperature, etc.). A variety of studies kept getting the same sensitivity. Meanwhile, other researchers used the actual warming of recent decades as a sort of natural experiment. They found that the patterns of heating measured deep in individual ocean basins neatly matched the patterns that computer models calculated for rising CO2. They found that the distribution of cloud types seen by satellites changed with warming much like the responses of computed clouds … and so forth.

    The most impressive feature of the ongoing natural experiment is rudimentary. If you superimpose the rising curve of CO2 since the 1950s on the rising curve of observed global temperature, you find an ominous match (the match is particularly precise if you assume that an exponential rise of CO2 should cause a linear rise of temperature—Arrhenius, for one, found this intuitively plausible). Extrapolate to doubled CO2, and the temperature rise is, yes, near 3 °C.

    In 1979, when the Academy panel made their estimate, the world was on track to reach doubled CO2 well before 2100. However, if nations adopt policies to fulfill the pledges they have made, we can arrest the rise a bit short of doubling—unless we have bad luck and, as some models find possible, the warming triggers a vicious cycle of additional greenhouse gas emissions.

    Climate models today explore hundreds of interacting processes in computer runs lasting weeks at teraflop rates. Nature does not allow a simple, transparent model for global warming. But we have something perhaps better: simple, transparent ways to show that we must take the models seriously.

    REFERENCES
    1.Key papers by Fourier, Tyndall, Arrhenius, Plass, Manabe, the National Academy “Charney” panel, Vostok researchers, and more are reprinted with commentary in D. Archer and R. T. Pierrehumbert (editors), The Warming Papers: The Scientific Foundation for the Climate Change Forecast (Wiley-Blackwell, Hoboken, NJ, 2011).

    2.For full history and references, see S. Weart, “Basic radiation calculations” and “Simple models of climate change” (American Institute of Physics, 2022)

    S. Weart, The Discovery of Global Warming, 2nd ed. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008).
    Google Scholar
    3.A short history from another viewpoint is H. Le Treut et al, “Historical overview of climate change science,” in S. Solomon, et al. (editors), Climate Change 2007:The Physical Basis of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007), pp. 93–127, https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/ar4_wg1_full_report-1.pdf.

    4.On matching CO2 and temperature curves, see J. Aber and S. V. Ollinger, “Simpler presentations of climate change,” Eos 103 (Sept. 13, 2022)
    5.For a college-level “simple” but reasonably complete model, see R. E. Benestad, “A mental picture of the greenhouse effect,” Theor. Appl. Climatol. 128, 679–688 (2017). All websites accessed Oct. 1, 2022.

    Spencer Weart published articles on solar physics in leading scientific journals and then turned to studying the history of science. From 1974 until his retirement in 2009, he was director of the Center for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics. His publications include children’s science books, The Rise of Nuclear Fear, and The Discovery of Global Warming.
    SCHWEPZ
    SCHWEPZ --- ---
    SCHWEPZ:
    The Green Wall project to restore the African Sahara is collapsing | The Independent
    https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/great-green-wall-africa-sahel-b2462087.html
    Can the Great Green Wall save the Sahel?
    https://african.business/2023/03/resources/is-africas-great-green-wall-collapsing
    Progress is slow on Africa’s Great Green Wall, but some bright spots bloom
    https://news.mongabay.com/2023/08/progress-is-slow-on-africas-great-green-wall-but-some-bright-spots-bloom/

    Senegal uvádí, že zalesnil více než 36 tisíc hektarů a vysadil přibližně 12 milionů sazenic, panují ale obavy, kolik z nich se v pouštních podmínkách uchytilo. Čad vysadil jen 1,1 milionu stromků, a to přesto, že podle listu African Business patří k největším příjemcům finančních prostředků z projektu.

    Portál Mongabay píše, že do letošního roku bylo osázeno 18 procent z plánovaných 100 milionů hektarů plochy. Dosažené výsledky se napříč jednotlivými zeměmi diametrálně liší. Etiopie, která se zalesňováním začala dříve než ostatní země, je zatím v čele. Podle oficiálních statistik do roku 2021 vysadila 5,5 miliardy sazenic na 151 tisících hektarech nových lesů.

    Nejambicióznější projekt zalesnění na světě, africká Velká zelená zeď, měla oživit vyprahlou africkou Saharu, obnovit přírodu a podpořit mír na kontinentu. Projekt ale šestnáct let po svém zahájení vázne. Podle expertů jsou na vině nedostatek finančních prostředků, bezpečnostní potíže spojené s teroristickými hrozbami nebo apatie místních politiků.

    Zdroj: https://www.idnes.cz/zpravy/zahranicni/afrika-velka-zelena-zed-zmena-klimatu-zivotni-prostredi-sazeni-stromy.A231220_144806_zahranicni_dtt
    TADEAS
    TADEAS --- ---
    After 30 years of waiting, Cop28 deal addresses the elephant in the room | Cop28 | The Guardian
    https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/dec/13/cop28-deal-significant-progress-tackle-climate-crisis
    TUHO
    TUHO --- ---
    L4MA: Hele ja tu negativitu chapu a sdilim ji, ale ta konference neni podle me absurdni. Ve stkuecnosti je to jedina sance jak se hnout kupredu, protoze ta akce neni mozna bez globalni koordinace. Problem je, ze je proste rada hracu, ktera vi, ze pro ne je to hrozba a snazi se ji torpedovat. Fosilni prumysl v USA se postavil na zadni hned zkraje 90. let a nalil stovky milionu do toho, aby kydal spinu na IPCC, COP, UN... Proc? Ty lidi nevyhazujou penize z okna jen tak pro nic za nic, chapou moc dobre, jaky pro ne mezinarodni dohody znamenaj riziko.

    Dalsi vec je, ze v ty zaplave negativnich zprav, ze se nam stale nedostalo dostat na trajektorii klimaticky stabilizace trochu se opomina, ze dost vyraznej progres se podaril. Ale ano, neni dostatecnej, je pozde, etc. Ale jestli je nejaka cesta dopredu, tak skrze mezinarodni vyjednavani.

    Kdyz si trochu zahalucinuju, tak mi zaroven prijde, ze proste chybi vetsi incentivy pro staty typu OPEC, ktery se v soucasny situaci cejtej jako hlavni loosers. Potrebovali bysme imho novou globalni financni infrastrukturu nejaky Brettonwoods pro 21. stoleti, ktera je to scohpna financovat a krome nakladu taky generovat nejaky jasny pobidky.

    Most people don’t realize how much progress we’ve made on climate change » Yale Climate Connections
    https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2023/11/most-people-dont-realize-how-much-progress-weve-made-on-climate-change/
    TUHO
    TUHO --- ---
    R_U_SIRIOUS: jako nejaky (podstatny) zmeny uz se podarily. ale bohuzel porad stale malo

    Most people don’t realize how much progress we’ve made on climate change » Yale Climate Connections
    https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2023/11/most-people-dont-realize-how-much-progress-weve-made-on-climate-change/
    TUHO
    TUHO --- ---
    TUHO: Based on current climate policies around the world, various groups estimate that we’re now on track for around 2.5°C (4.5°F) global warming by 2100.

    On the one hand, that’s not yet good enough to meet the target set in the Paris agreement. On the other hand, climate policies and clean technologies deployed over just the past eight years have already erased a full degree Celsius of global warming from the future world in 2100. Governments need to do more in the coming years to bring the Paris goals within reach, but the progress made over just the past eight years has been remarkable, especially in comparison to the prior decades of futility.
    TUHO
    TUHO --- ---
    Most people don’t realize how much progress we’ve made on climate change » Yale Climate Connections
    https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2023/11/most-people-dont-realize-how-much-progress-weve-made-on-climate-change/
    TUHO
    TUHO --- ---
    Challenges and opportunities for climate policy integration in oil-producing countries: the case of the UAE and Oman

    In the context of international climate change obligations, Gulf Arab states have introduced policies to integrate climate policies into economic development and planning, seeking to maximize clean development opportunities yet at the same time to minimize the threats to their rentier economies caused by sudden shifts away from fossil fuels. This paper assesses the challenges and opportunities for climate policy integration in the Gulf states of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman, examining the interaction between their climate policy and their political–economic regimes. It adopts a novel analytical framework that integrates insights from climate policy integration and the political–economic theory of rentier states. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and relevant policy documents, it reveals modest progress in integrating climate policy into economic development plans in the UAE but major impediments to climate policy integration in Oman. Both countries face significant shortfalls in climate-related financial and human resource capacities. Climate policy integration efforts have focused on the energy sector with the purpose of protecting rents from oil exports rather than advancing a low-carbon transformation of their economies. This has created structural ambiguity in the climate policy integration advanced in the UAE and Oman.

    https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2020.1781036
    TUHO
    TUHO --- ---
    Great-power politics, order transition, and climate governance: insights from international relations theory

    The complex politics of climate change cannot be properly understood without reference to deeper geopolitical trends in the wider international system. Chief among these is the growing resurgence of ‘great-power politics’ between China and the US, along with failures of socialization and enmeshment into global governance structures in relation to these two powers. Traditional theoretical frameworks have failed to adequately account for these developments. Nonetheless, this current great-power contestation is at the core of an order transition that has prevented the large-scale institutional redesign required to remove deadlocks in existing global governance structures, including climate governance. Examples from the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference provide ample evidence for these claims. The slow progress of the climate change negotiations are due not just to the politics of the issue itself, but to the absence of a new political bargain on material power structures, normative beliefs, and the management of the order amongst the great powers. Without such a grand political bargain, which could be promoted through a forum of major economies whose wide-ranging remit would go beyond single issues, the climate change regime is only ever likely to progress in a piecemeal fashion.

    https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2013.818849
    TUHO
    TUHO --- ---
    Sbornik o existencnich rizicich - vystup konference ze Stanfordu. Prispevek tam ma i kral historie klimatologie Paul N. Edwards (na strane 133)

    Is Climate Change Ungovernable?
    Abstract: This paper reviews the potential for catastrophic, civilization-threatening climate change
    within the next 2-3 centuries if climate sensitivity is on the high end of IPCC estimates and the
    thresholds of various tipping points are crossed. I argue that empirical evidence supports a
    substantial likelihood of future climate policy reversals by major emitters, resulting in continuing
    accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. On high-end sensitivity estimates, Paris
    Agreement pledges to date are insufficient even if fully implemented. Policy is always reversible,
    and major reversals have already occurred. Climate denialism and misdirection can, and probably
    will, be amplified by artificial intelligence and social media. Finally, the focus on international
    governance mechanisms obscures the many levels of jurisdiction that must be engaged for strong
    climate policy to take effect. The paper concludes that while renewable energy progress presents a
    hopeful note, chances are high that current structu

    Intersections, Reinforcements, Cascades
    Proceedings of the 2023 Stanford Existential Risks Conference

    https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:pn116pv4512/Intersections%2C%20Reinforcements%2C%20Cascades_Proceedings%20of%20the%202023%20Stanford%20Existential%20Risks%20Conference.pdf#page=133
    TADEAS
    TADEAS --- ---
    The shadowy companies holding back progress on climate | XR UK
    https://youtu.be/_kozySKfJHs?si=47-Ki6UmP9dCsiYe
    PER2
    PER2 --- ---
    hele, klimaticka krize uz je vyresena, konec paniky (cringe hardcore overload)

    Tim Cook
    At Apple, we believe that climate change is one of the world’s most urgent priorities and we are deeply committed to doing our part. Today we had a special guest—a real force of nature—stop by to check on our progress.
    video:
    https://twitter.com/i/status/1701732427897491578

    (ps: nezapomente si koupit appple watch)
    TADEAS
    TADEAS --- ---
    We Already Live in a Degrowth World, and We Do Not like It | IZA - Institute of Labor Economics
    https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/16191/we-already-live-in-a-degrowth-world-and-we-do-not-like-it

    The Degrowth Movement calls for "degrowth" – a reduction in GDP in advanced economies – to avert an ecological crisis. This paper argues that the Degrowth Movement misses that the West is already in a state resembling degrowth – a Great Stagnation. This state of degrowth and its correlates, declining entrepreneurship, innovation, science, and research productivity, are described. It is concluded that the notion that a degrowth economy can generate the technological progress necessary to tackle ecological and social crises and challenges is far-fetched. Moreover, as economic stagnation has taught, the consequence of degrowth is a zero-sum society: redistribution, instead of production, becomes the basis of the economy. In such a context, more degrowth will only make problems worse. This paper concludes by discussing scenarios for moving beyond Degrowth. Whether collapse or unimaginable riches through breakthrough technological progress will be the future, these scenarios suggest that there is more to humanity's future than envisaged by the Degrowth Movement.
    Kliknutím sem můžete změnit nastavení reklam